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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect on industry 
output of union density both conceptually and 
empirically in the case of the Australian 
Building and Construction industry. The 
classical view of the effects of a heavily 
unionised industry is that by exhibiting some 
m arket power, unions are able to extract 
above normal rents and cause industrial 
disruption, which is reflected in lower 
industry employment and higher wages. More 
contemporary beliefs describing the effect of 
unions concentrates on issu es related to the 
external information benefits provided by 
union movements. By voicing information 
related to exit, it is argued that the resulting 
lower labour turnover and other related costs 
dominate possible higher wage and lower 
employment outcomes supposedly generated 
by heavily unionised sectors. Empirical 
evidence from Australia in the case of the 
heavily unionised Building and Construction 
industry, does not support the classical view 
that higher union density inhibits the output 
performance of the industry in the long run. 
The estim ates also reveal a quick path to long 
run equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
The classical literature argues that more intense union involvement 
in an industry, by introducing monopoly power on the supply- 
side of the labour market, has the effect of restricting employment 
and allowing higher wages than would be the case under the 
competitive outcome (see for instance, Friedman & Friedman 
1962, pp. 123-5 and the discussions of Bok & Dunlop 1970, pp. 
260-1 or Kerr 1957). In addition, by pursuing what is perceived 
(by employers) to be above-normal work conditions the possible 
industrial disputation which follows is costly to the industry 
causing loss in output and declining profits. However, more recent 
literature in this area including Hirschman (1970), Clark (1984), 
Freedman and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and Link (1984), Hirsch
(1987), argue that the classical model neglects to incorporate 
some of the information-related benefits which union movements 
provide, such as those benefits which stem from exit and voice 
behaviour. Such behaviour, to be elaborated on further in section 
2, includes the ability of a union to provide cost savings for the 
firm by restricting labour turnover, and by disseminating 
information on work-related issues such as conditions, specific 
job tasks, workplace hazards, and more productive work 
practices, in a coherent, centralised, and organised way. By 
including such behavioural advantages of unions in an analysis of 
union effects, the benefits to workplace productivity may 
dominate the obvious wage, employment and industrial 
disputation costs, thus allowing unions to be a net advantage to 
industry.
In order to provide evidence of the connection between union 
density and industrial performance, we conduct a time series, 
regression-based empirical investigation of the Australian 
Building and Construction (ABC) industry; an industry which is
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characterised by heavy union involvement. The empirical 
investigation will take place over the early 1980's to the mid 
1990's using quarterly data. This empirical approach is unique in 
the literature since it examines the time series properties of 
regression arguments, while also testing for the existence of long 
run relationships. This uniqueness stems from the fact that most 
papers discussing the union density/output nexus were written 
well before these techniques were standard. This paper is also a 
contribution to the literature by virtue of the arguments used to 
explain industry output apart from union density. Explanatory 
variables such as Gross Domestic Product, input prices, interest 
rates on loans borrowed for housing construction purposes, 
together, have rarely been employed in the literature with some 
exceptions (to be noted in Section 2). This paper also examines 
the short run adjustment to equilibrium by using the Engle-Granger 
two step procedure, another unique feature of the paper.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
presents some theoretical aspects of the relationship between 
union density and industry output, as well as reviewing the 
empirical literature. Section 3 introduces the data set and the 
specification used for investigation of the abovementioned 
relationship, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results in the 
context of the salient features of the ABC industry. The final 
section concludes the paper.
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Theoretical Literature
In the classical literature it is argued that a competitive labour 
market will realise a lower wage and higher employment outcome 
than would be the case had the market been characterised by 
imperfections on the supply side, particularly in the case of 
labour union-induced imperfections. This also implies that the
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performance of the industry will also suffer through lower output 
and profits. The standard reasons why this may be the case 
include; (i) labour union actions which shift the demand and 
supply curves for labour, (especially in the case of craft labour 
unions) for the benefit of members, (ii) cohesive labour unions 
may bargain directly for settlements which substantially exceed 
the offer of firms, and (iii) large industrial labour unions have 
significant relative bargaining strength. In this latter case unions 
are able to have collective bargains extended to cover both 
unionised and non-unionised sectors through the award system 
and by the use of pattern agreements in the enterprise bargaining 
sphere.
Recent models of union behaviour and their effects on 
industrial performance focus on the cost savings that may be 
achieved due to the presence of unions. Hirschman (and later 
Freeman and Medoff) argues that union voice  behaviour can be 
an important source of cost saving for the firm as exit behaviour 
may be reduced, although it is still admitted that additional costs 
associated with unions exist. Characterisation of voice and exit 
behaviour originated with the contribution of Hirschman (1970), 
in which the narrow view of the classical school is broadened in 
order to account for voice and exit.
The concept of exit is based on the idea that each worker has 
a clear perception of how they are being treated in the workplace. 
If their perceived treatment is favourable, that is, their wages and 
working conditions are, presumably, at least comparable to their 
next best alternative employment, the worker will remain with the 
firm. By remaining, this is a reflection of the satisfaction of a 
worker with his or her employer, which is information that is 
quickly disseminated to other employees, thus the firm obtains a 
reputation of prioritising the welfare of workers. Conversely, a 
worker who believes they are receiving a relatively unfair deal is 
reflected in him or her leaving the firm. The firm's reputation is
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tarnished in the eyes of both incumbent and prospective 
employees. However, this is not the only cost borne by the firm. 
When an employee leaves, the employer suffers pecuniarily by 
virtue of labour turnover and related costs such as recruiting new 
employees, and the (sunk) loss of employees which carry skills 
and training financed by the firm.
The concept of voice  follows directly from the notion of exit. 
As the name suggests, voice represents the preferences of 
employees which are often directed through formal representative 
bodies (usually unions) or through established grievance 
procedures. By allowing the employer advanced knowledge of the 
views of employees before they exit, the firm may be able to 
remedy wages and conditions sufficiently to avoid exit, thus 
saving employers from the associated exit costs. However, exit 
costs are not the only costs which can be manifested in the 
perceived unfair treatment of workers; industrial disputes, 
shirking, poor quality control, lethargy, and pilferage may also be 
a reflection of mistreatment. By providing cost savings for the 
firm as a result of avoiding unnecessary strike activity, exit and 
the rest, the union is able to improve profit, output and 
productivity performances which may possibly dominate the 
increase in costs likely to flow from higher wage demands.
Voice and exit do not exhaust the potential benefits to 
employers of unions. Management may use unions as a focal 
point through which all employees can be informed of changes to 
the employment relationship. Unions will also discipline workers 
if individuals or groups try to break from the union-management 
deal. Additionally, by acting as a representative of employees, 
unions are able to group the negotiations of all workers into one 
process, rather than staggering individual wage claims within the 
firm or enterprise.
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The aforementioned theoretical analysis invites an empirical 
investigation of the effects of strong unions on industrial 
performance. With most union/industrial performance analyses 
having been undertaken in the US, three approaches appear to be 
most favoured. Although the following is a far from exhaustive 
detailing of all studies in the area, we believe that major strands 
of research and results have been covered in the following.
The first approach is an aggregate study of all manufacturing 
establishments (see for instance, Brown & Medoff 1978). This 
method appears to be the least favoured, perhaps due to the 
indiscriminate way in which it handles aggregated data from 
what are essentially heterogeneous data collection points. 
Stepping away from that fundamentally macro approach, a more 
specific and popular method of investigation is employed which 
involves industry-specific data. Addison and Hirsch (1989) refer 
to studies based on this methodology as firm/business 
econometric analyses (for representative examples, see Clark 
1984; Hirsch & Connolly 1987; and Connolly, Hirsch & Hirschey 
1986). These are by far the most prevalent forms of study into the 
union effect/firm performance phenomena. The least used format 
for investigation has been the specific case study based on a 
single industry. Clark's (1980a, 1980b) studies into the cement 
industry being an exception rather than a rule. Mandelstamm 
writing in 1965 employed a localised industry study, although 
this cannot be considered a forerunner to the investigations of the 
1970's, 1980's and 1990's due to its non-reliance on a production 
or cost function approach. Allen (1984, 1986) similarly has 
concentrated his study on a specific industry, and it is perhaps at 
this level that the greatest recognition of the problems associated 
with aggregation have occurred. This follows from the fact that at 
the level of an industry specific study, particular contextual 
variables associated with a selected work, economic and
The Empirical Literature
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industrial relations culture can be more readily identified.
Productivity and profitability have been the most celebrated 
measure of firm performance of late, with few investigations 
dealing specifically with the union effect on output. However 
since output is an indicator of industry/firm performance, a 
comparison of results, if not methodologies is a valid undertaking.
Turning to the productivity measure of firm performance, Allen 
(1984, 1986), Mandelstamm (1965), Clark (1980a; 1980b), Brown 
and Medoff (1978) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) all found a 
positive union influence on productivity. Running counter to these 
positive results and not previously cited are the outcomes 
presented by Connerton, Freeman and Medoff (1983), Metcalf
(1988), Edwards (1987), Davies and Caves (1987) and Machin 
(1987), with Machin concluding that unions can have both 
positive and negative results depending upon the circumstances 
(for a critical examination of the latter four, see Nolan & 
Marginson 1990). Clearly, there is no distinct trend for all 
circumstances. Market conditions, industrial relations processes 
and 'culture', the type and location of production if not the 
technologies used within it, all conspire to produce environments 
in which no sure prediction can be made regarding the outcomes 
of unions. Each situation must be dealt with individually.
Shifting our focus to the profitability measure of performance, 
we find that Clark (1984), Hirsch and Connolly (1987), Connolly, 
Hirsch and Hirschey (1986) and Becker and Olson (1992) (to cite 
just a few of the studies in this area) have reported negative union 
effects on firm/industry profits. Flowever some researchers have 
uncovered, if not contradictory, then at least an unsecure tether 
between the effects of organised labour and a firm or industry's 
profit outcome. For example, Mandelstamm found there to be 
little effect on profits regardless of the degree of unionisation and 
of significance to this concept is Clark's (1984) mature 
interpretation of the issue encapsulated by his statement that
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"(t)he large body of evidence on the union wage effect ... is not 
sufficient to establish a union effect on profits" (p. 893).1
Unlike the American and British investigations into this field, 
Australian research is relatively underdeveloped. Considering the 
prevalence of union influence in Australian industry, and the 
commonly held perception that unions are a intransigent entity in 
the employment relationship which do nothing more than increase 
costs and reduce employment opportunities, it is somewhat odd 
that more research has not been undertaken.
Productivity analysis has been the area of most interest to 
Australian researchers. Phipps and Sheen (1994) have attempted 
to follow the Freeman and Medoff approach by using a 
production function technique applied to the Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) data. 
Endeavouring to explain equilibrium output, they include supply 
side variables (for example, capital stock and employment), along 
with proxies of what constitute 'good' or 'bad' industrial 
relations. By including these receptive indicators the authors have 
attempted to counter a significant criticism of the Harvard model 
as identified by Turnbull (1991). with the criticism centring on the 
inability of the Harvard model to explain the industrial relations 
environment. The inclusion of these indicators is quite reasonable 
given that Metcalf came to the conclusion that the quality of 
industrial relations is probably the main determinant of 
productivity growth or decay, with Turnbull also conceding to 
this dictum when he states that "most scholars would broadly 
accept this proposition" (1991, p. 136). Freeman and Medoff also 
resolutely support this notion when they cite studies which have
1 For a more complete summary of the international literature 
dealing with union effects on firm performance debate, see the 
tables presented in Addison and Hirsch (1989) and Freeman and 
Medoff (1984).
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examined the link between the industrial relations climate and 
productivity (1984, pp. 176-9). Where this study may have the 
question of bias raised against it is in the failure to identify the 
demand side variables which are important in explaining output. 
Consideration of supply side variables only in explaining an 
output measure which is driven by both demand and supply side 
factors gives rise to concern over omitted variable bias in the 
empirical investigation.
Moving away from the classical US production function 
technique, Crockett et al (1992) and Drago and Wooden (1992) 
chose to analyse the AWIRS data through the use of the Ordered 
Probit estimation technique for relative productivity estimation. 
The weakness of this investigation is that the data used for 
productivity estimation is highly problematic. The data fails to 
accurately represent the actual productivity change in firms due 
to its reliance on perceptions of relative firm productivity 
performance and how their productivity is affected by, amongst 
other factors, labour market and labour usage restrictions as 
observed by the managers of firms. Clearly such data is open to 
the vagrancy's of subjective estimation, and thus any results 
stemming from such a measure should be treated with caution. In 
defence of the authors, they duly note the need for prudent 
interpretation of the results given the problematic nature of their 
data source.
Alexander and Green (1992) approach the study field from a 
different perspective, relying on a range of performance indicators 
which may be effected by an extensive agglomeration of 
explanatory variables, including productivity, ability of the firm 
to change, output quality and/or the relationships between 
employers and management. Using the LOGISTIC regression 
technique, their empirical investigation involves the employment 
of both qualitative endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Although they have findings that good communication between
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management and the labour force produces improved firm 
performance, which is supportive of some of the US and UK 
evidence, the lack of a readily definable productivity measure 
appears to limit this study's relevance in the broader debate on 
the impact of unionised labour on firm performance.
Perhaps in the Australian context one further type of 
investigation requires attention; the specific industry/firm or 
production line case study approach based on microeconomic 
data. Lansbury (1992) attempted a case study of the vehicle 
component industry, focusing on one part of the output and 
comparing this with a Swedish plant. Lansbury's methodology, in 
part, echoes that of the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE), (see 
for instance, BIE 1990; 1991) by using the international 
comparative case study approach. The significant benefit of such 
a study is that it allows for an in-depth focus on microeconomic 
factors, conceivably though its weakness is also its strength as 
macroeconomic factors are somewhat excluded from the 
investigation. However Lansbury does acknowledge the effects of 
a significant macroeconomic factor in the recession of 1991-92 on 
firm level performance. A positive feature of this study is that 
real measures of input and output (or close proxies) are used 
allowing for less contentious productivity analysis. The scope of 
the relevance of such an approach to other firms or other 
industries is somewhat limited, although as a more general 
commentary on microeconomic factors affecting output and firm 
performance this type of study has much to offer.
In summary, the Australian literature in this field is still in a 
developmental state, although this does not preclude the 
possibility that research outcomes can provide a valuable lesson 
for policy makers. All Australian studies have their problems and 
in essence these may be grouped into two categories. Firstly, the 
data from which the analysis has originated may not provide an 
accurate picture of the actual circumstances found at firm or
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industry levels. Secondly, all important determinants of firm 
performance need to be included in the analysis so as to not 
produce any unnecessary bias. This has not always been the case 
in the Australian work to date. Our research aims to improve on 
the second of these failings by including demand side factors, 
while rectifying the first problem by including actual firm 
performance information rather than subjective managerial 
derived opinions.
3. EN G LE-G R A N G ER  TW O -STEP E ST IM A T IO N  OF U N IO N  
EFFEC TS
In this section we derive long run and dynamic responses of the 
performance of the ABC industry to shocks in union density. The 
estimates are undertaken using the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step 
procedure, which proceeds by estimating a long run static 
(cointegrating) regression, and then uses the vector of long run 
coefficient estimates to determine the dynamics of the adjustment 
to long run equilibrium. Prior to applying the Engle-Granger 
procedure we examine the stationarity properties of the data.
T h e A rgum ents to be Used
In order to examine the performance of the ABC industry we use 
as a proxy the level of output in that industry, or more 
specifically the 1984-85 constant dollar value of building work 
done measured in units of millions of dollars. In order to explain 
this performance we employ as regressors actual average weekly 
earnings in the ABC industry, an index (1984-85 = 100) of the 
price of materials used in that industry, the rental cost of capital 
proxied by the rate of interest levied on the borrowings of larger 
firms, the cost of borrowed finance for residential construction 
(demand-driven variable affecting the demand for housing
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construction), Australian real Gross Domestic Product (current 
dollars), union density measured in percentage terms, the number 
of overtime hours worked, and the number of days lost as a result 
of industrial disputation.
Let us now justify the use of the above mentioned explanatory 
arguments. Consider a simplified model of the building and 
construction industry in Australia. Suppose that this industry is 
imperfectly competitive, consisting of a number of large firms and 
a number of small firms. Each firm has production technology 
which is described by the following general function:
qi =  q;(L, M, K),
where L is the total number of labour units employed by firm i, M 
is the quantity of materials employed, and K is the quantity of 
capital employed. If we imagine that there are two types of labour 
units employed by the large and small firms, namely unionised, 
Lu, and non-unionised, Lnu, then the production technology 
becomes:
qi = q;(Lu + Lnu, M, K).
In order to analyse the effects of union density, U = Lu/  (Lu + 
Lnu) on output of the industry as a whole, Q, some of the 
aforementioned studies, such as Freeman and Medoff (1984), 
concentrate solely on the production function effects of changes in 
UD, that is, they simply examine the effects of changes in U on q;. 
Such studies neglect to incorporate information about demand. 
Let us now consider what we would expect as a typical inverse 
demand function in the case of the ABC industry:
P = P(Q, Y, rH),
where th is the cost of borrowing money for the purpose of 
purchasing building and construction output (including the 
purchase of a house), Y is national income and P is an index of
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the price of output in the ABC industry. Consider the problem of 
a representative large firm (say firm i). If such a firm wishes to 
maximise profits the problem is:
Max n =  P(q.i, q,(Lu + Lnu, M, K), Y, rH)qi
- w(Lu + Lnu) - fj^K - Pm.M.
where the exogenous variables of the problem are q_; which is the 
vector of outputs of all the other firms in the industry, w is the 
unionised and non-unionised wage rate, rK is the rental cost of 
capital and Pm is the price of materials.
In solving this problem for the choice variables Lu, Lnu/ M, and 
K we obtain the factor demand functions (assuming solutions 
exist):
Lu = LU(Y, rH, w, rK/ Pm),
L n u  ~ Lnu(Y, rH/ W , Tk, P m )/
M = M(Y, rH, W , rK, Pm)/
K = K(Y, rH/ w, rK/ Pm).
The representative firm's supply function becomes: 
qi = qi(Y rH, w, rK, Pm), 
or if we aggregate across firms we obtain:
Q = Q(Y, rH, w, no, Pm)-
What we have not included in this analysis are industrial 
relations/labour productivity related factors, including the effects 
of union density, overtime hours worked, O and industrial 
disputation, I. If we augment our supply function with such 
factors we obtain:
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Q -  Q(Y, rH, w, rK, Pm, U, O, I).
This is the general form of the function employed in this study in 
order to explain the performance of the ABC industry. If we 
assume that the form of the function is linear then we obtain our 
industrial performance specification:
Q = a0 + axY + a2rH + a3w + a4rK + a5Pm + a6U
+ sljO + a§I + e,
where e is the disturbance term.
In order to estimate our industrial performance specification, 
the data used is quarterly and extends from September 1982 to 
June 1994, which is the period over which the data is availab le. 
Prior to estimating the specification, however, we need to conduct 
unit root tests.
Unit Root Tests
Dickey-Fuller tests for the existence of unit roots are presented in 
Table 1, where Q is ABC industry output, w is the level of 
average weekly earnings in the industry, r^ is the rental cost of 
capital, Pm is a price index of materials used in the ABC industry, 
U is the percentage of union density in the industry, Y is the level 
of real Australian GDP, th is the cost of borrowing housing 
finance, O is the number of overtime hours worked and I is the 
number of days lost as a result of industrial disputation. The 
optimal lag length in the Dickey-Fuller tests is found by consulting 
t-values and the Durbin-h or Durbin-Watson statistic (to 
determine whether the specification from which the unit root 
statistic is obtained is acceptable). Our results indicate that 
variables are either 1(0) (integrated of order zero and hence 
stationary in levels) or 1(1) (integrated of order 1 and hence
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stationary in first differences).2 This implies that a long run 
relationship will be present as long as the 1(0) variables and the 
1(1) variables are cointegrated. The presence of a long run 
relationship will be reflected in the stationarity properties of the 
residual term which will be determined once the long run 
regression has been estimated.
Table 1 
Dickey-Fuller Tests
Variable Levels
First
Difference
Order of 
Integration
Q -2.930 -5.455 1(1)
w -3.045 -5.535 1(1)
rK -3.512 1(0)
Pm -1.233 -5.826 1(1)
u -0.865 -6.343 1(1)
Y -0.533 -6.027 1(1)
th -4.324 1(0)
I -3.774 1(0)
O -3.550 1(0)
Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients (b Vector)
OLS estimates of the long run cointegrating vector for ABC 
industry output is given in Table 2 below along with standard 
diagnostic measures and absolute t-values. Critical values at the
2 The critical values are those associated with the unit root 
regression with constant and trend, equal to -3.50 at the 5% 
level (T=50), (Fuller 1976 pp. 373).
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5% level are given in parentheses, where relevant, for the 
diagnostic statistics.
The Dickey-Fuller statistic for the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship is -5.469 with 5% critical value equal to -4.76 (Engle 
& Yoo 1987), while the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 1.969 with 5% critical value equal to 1.28, thus both 
tests support the existence of a long run relationship, and hence 
we are permitted to interpret the coefficient estimates as long run 
responses.
The results in Table 2 indicate that five out of eight variables 
are significant at the 5% level (6 at the 10% level) and they all, 
arguably, have the correct sign, where the sign associated with tk 
is ambiguous for the following reasons. The variable r^ represents 
either the cost of borrowing for the purpose of purchasing capital 
or the return to investing residual profits in interest earning 
ventures. The first option will generate a negative effect on output 
and the second will cause a positive effect. The fact that we 
obtained a positive effect implies that the cost of capital effect is, 
perhaps, dominated by the interest earning effects. The remaining 
diagnostics such as the coefficient stability tests, (CUSUM and 
CUSUMQ), the serial correlation test, (CRDW), the test for 
normality, (Jarque-Bera), for heteroskedasticity, (Breusch-Pagan- 
Godfrey), and the general misspecification/functional form test, 
(RESET), reveal a healthy estimated specification from which, as 
a result, we can obtain accurate estimates of coefficients and tests 
of significance.
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Table 2
OLS Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients
Variable Coefficient Absolute T-Value
Constant 45.922 0.1226
w -1.1707 0.1753
Tk 142.29 2.253*
th -96.572 0.9645
I 0.00663 1.769**
O 506.31 2.009*
Y 0.2051 3.501*
Pm -121.89 2.423*
u 132.2 4.032*
* Significant at the 5% level.
* *  Significant at the 10% level.
R 2 = 0.9279, CRDW = 1.969 (1.28), Jarque-Bera = 1.3204 (5.99)
RESET(2) = 0.0205 (4.15), Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey = 6.333 (9.488)
CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics within boundaries.
The most important result is the coefficient estimate on union 
density, which significantly  implies that a more densely 
unionised ABC industry will cause an increase in the output of 
that industry contrary to the classical predictions. Specifically, 
the coefficient indicates that a 1% rise in union density causes an 
increase in output by $132 million. More generally, this result 
suggests that the more contemporary models of union behaviour 
may have some empirical validity, in that the empirical results
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show that a more unionised sector causes an improvement in the 
economic performance of that sector.
This estimate of the relationship between union density and 
industry output is relatively precise for small movements in the 
level of union density. In the case of taking the change in union 
density to its extremes, for instance, examining the effect of 100% 
or 0% union density on ABC industry output, the estimated 
coefficient obtained in our specification is less useful by virtue of 
the fact that the extreme values are well outside the values 
considered by our empirical specification. As a consequence, 
attempts to use our model for forecasting extreme values of union 
density should be taken cautiously.
4. DISCUSSION
So why is there an observed positive relationship between unions 
and output in the building and construction industry of 
Australia? The following observations/explanations seek more to 
generate debate then to unequivocally identify the reasons behind 
the calculated positive relationship.
The relatively itinerant nature of employment relationships 
within the industry may help to explain our results. Workers 
move from job to job depending on the availability of work, 
although this does not necessarily mean that they leave the 
industry or are more likely to exit in comparison to employees in 
other industries (A.B.S. Cat. No. 6209.0, various issues of the 
period under investigation). Significant labour mobility (shifting 
between jobs before the work is completed), be it voluntary or 
involuntary, may have a deleterious effect on output. Thus, there 
is an incentive to both employers and employees to reduce the 
costly effect of exit. Were a union to have an impact in the 
reduction of labour mobility or dis-satisfaction, then it is quite 
conceivable that unions could have a positive effect on output.
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It is therefore argued that an effective union is a regulating 
influence on the labour market. A 'web of rules', both procedural 
and substantive, help to reduce uncertainty in the minds of labour 
and thus lower the exit related actions of that labour. Localised 
(one site) sets of rules would have little effect, although with some 
degree of standardisation of work conditions and remuneration 
over many job sites, a reduction in the exit incentive would exist. 
The awards associated with the building and construction trades 
go some way to providing a standardising influence on the 
conditions of employment. In conclusion, regulation of the labour 
market on one hand may be seen as a market imperfection yet on 
the other, may actually aid the production process by stabilising a 
construction site's workforce.
Delays to construction activity would conceivably lower 
output for any given period. The union induced strike is an 
obvious source of delay, yet it is actually inclement weather that 
is the major disruption in building and construction activity. By 
contrast the use of the strike or other overt industrial action 
accounted for very little of the extensions to construction time. In 
the case of General building projects, which sees a greater 
proportion of unionisation than the Cottage building sector (The 
Royal Commission into Productivity in the Building Industry of 
New South Wales 1991a, pp. 23-4; 1991b, pp. 12-3), industrial 
action caused 8% of all building and construction delays 
compared to 49% for inclement weather.3 Our findings support 
this observed minor relationship; that there is no significant 
association between strike activity and output (refer to Table 2.). 
The question needing to be answered is "Is the strike such a 
destructive weapon?". We argue that strike activity, and 
industrial disputation in general, may indeed benefit the industry
3 Due to space considerations the union's strict interpretation of 
inclement weather cannot be covered in detail here.
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since without this voice (the strike), dis-satisfaction or exit takes 
place. Voice though, is only affective when the employer can hear 
it, and 'productive' dialogue between employees and employers is 
an indication that employee voice is being heard. Therefore to 
reduce both turnover and costly over-runs, it is in the interest of 
employers engaged in ’productive1 dialogue to have matters 
regarding the employment contract settled before work takes 
place at a site. As a consequence, we argue that the negotiation of 
such a contract is best handled through the union which may 
negotiate on behalf of all workers and in turn, the union will help 
to enforce the agreement. Additionally, the same union will act as 
a part overseer of work to help ensure a timely delivery of 
product (output).
The much reported industrial militancy of unions in the ABC 
industry in the early to mid 1980’s may actually have benefited 
the industry by forcing the parties to the negotiation table in order 
to secure stable workplace and industry agreements. Perhaps a 
shock effect has operated here (Hirschman 1970; Freeman & 
Medoff 1984). Reports published by the Parliament House 
Construction Authority and the Darling Harbour Authority 
suggest that improved labour output and a reduction in disputes 
will occur when both the employer and employee know exactly 
(within reason) what is each party's responsibility (Royal 
Commission Into Productivity in the Building Industry of New 
South Wales 1992 pp. 158-9). What is seen here, with the 
negotiation of work agreements and the adhering to them, is 
perhaps an indication of an employment relationship with 
attributes that may be explained by the somewhat nebulous 
expression, 'good industrial relations'. And although we do not 
model proxies of 'good' or for that matter 'bad' industrial 
relations, we tentatively make the assumption that 'good' 
industrial relations exist in the industry given our findings of a 
positive connection between unions and output. This may be the
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feature that we are picking up in the results, which would be quite 
supportive of the notions advanced by Metcalf (1988), Turnbull 
(1991), Freeman and Medoff (1984), and Belman (1992) amongst 
others.
The influence of factors outside of the control of both 
employees and employers could also have contributed to the 
result that we have observed. The general state of the economy, 
which in turn affects most domestic industries is one such factor. 
Another possible factor may be the recent historical high rates of 
unemployment. They could affect the way in which employees 
and employers interact, with unions not so much pushing for 
better terms and conditions of employment as engaging in 
concession bargaining or at least consolidating past gains. Unions 
may have found it prudent to negotiate clear labour relations 
contracts and thus set procedural and substantive rules of 
employment in order to sure up support for the employment of 
their members on building and construction sites. This is set 
within a more uncertain environment for trade unions where, 
increasingly, employers have looked to private hiring halls and the 
like which may or may not use unionised labour (Underhill and 
Kelly 1993). This employer initiative surely places pressure on 
unions to not 'rock the boat' or provide employers with an even 
greater incentive to search for non-traditional (non-unionised, or 
non-affiliated) labour.
And finally, legislative requirements and the role of wage 
setting principles should not be overlooked here either, as it is 
quite conceivable that the influence of the Restructuring and 
Efficiency Principles and the Structural Efficiency Principles 
aided the development of greater dialogue between labour and 
capital throughout half of the period under observation. This in 
turn promoted a closer understanding of the pressures each have 
and are facing.
Our model did not allow for an exact explanation of why
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unions improve the output performance of the industry. And we 
can not help but agree with Allen (1986) (even though the focus of 
the studies differ slightly, with Allen examining productivity and 
ours looking at one component of productivity), when he states 
that:
even with relatively detailed data it is very difficult to identify  
precisely the sources of union-nonunion productivity differences.
Allen 1986, p. 197
Relatively detailed data did not exist for our study, so we are 
only left with a more speculative approach to explaining the 
mechanisms associated with the positive union effect.
Having never been the intention of this paper to exactly 
explain the employment relationship dynamics associated with 
our findings, the above can in no way be considered an exhaustive 
catalogue of reasons associated with our results. Our model 
sought to explain output through the use of a number of 
explanatory variables, and not just the union density figure. We 
believe that the union density variable is not just representative of 
the percentage of workers that are unionised, but is also an 
indication of a wider and more complex set of labour/capital 
interactions.
Estimates of the Dynamic Response by ABC Industry Output
In order to estimate how ABC industry output responds to 
exogenous shocks in the short nm, we use the Engle-Granger two 
step procedure, the first step of this procedure already completed 
through the estimation of the long run regression above. This 
method involves estimating the following specification:
k
AQt = bo + biet-i + I  afAZf-j + vt,
2=1
- 21 -
where Z is a vector of all of the variables (both endogenous and 
exogenous) in the model, e is the residual from the static 
(cointegrating) regression, and v is a disturbance term satisfying 
the classical assumptions. The lag k for the Engle-Granger 
dynamic specification is selected to be 2 based on using Sims' 
(1980) adjusted LR test, resulting in the estimated specification 
given in Table 3.
The important coefficient estimate is that associated with the 
residual term, -1.0577, which provides information about the 
dynamic response to equilibrium. Since the result is close to unity, 
this implies that there is an almost instantaneous adjustment to 
equilibrium in response to a shock in an exogenous variable. Thus 
for instance, in the case of a 1% increase in union density in 
period t, the response by the ABC industry output is to rise by 
$132 million in period t without any lagged response.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the effect on an industry's performance, 
proxied by output, of having a heavily unionised labour force. In 
theory, there are two general schools of thought in terms of 
analysing these effects. The old school argues, correctly, that a 
union will push for above competitive wage demands which will 
drive employment lower than what would be the case under the 
competitive outcome, which in turn causes lower output and 
profits. The new school believes that this view is too narrow, 
neglecting important considerations associated with union groups 
avoiding unnecessary labour turnover, allowing cohesive, 
consensus-type bargaining, and transmitting important human 
capital-augmenting information to unionised members, thus 
enhancing labour productivity. An empirical investigation into the 
ABC industry, a relatively heavily unionised sector of the 
Australian economy, shows that a 1% increase in unionisation
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causes a $132 million gain in long run output for that industry. 
The short run dynamics reveal that a shock to union density in 
quarter t flows through to output entirely in t, with no 
adjustments occurring thereafter.
Table 3
Estimates of the Dynamic Response
Variable Coefficient Absolute T-Value
et-2 -1.0577 2.634
A Q u 0.10898 0.3585
Awt-i -6.1649 0.7488
Arm-1 583. 94 2.454
ArKt-1 142.21 1.715
Alt. i -0.00201 0.5725
AOm -824.25 2.776
AUm -105.58 0.2428
AYt-i 0.03337 0.2437
APmt-1 -90.405 0.3594
AQt-2 0.2358 1.114
Awt-2 -8.9943 1.094
ArHt-2 9.5693 0.0399
ArKt-2 -224.87 2.304
Alt-2 -0.00016 0.05343
AOt-2 -188.33 0.5934
AUt-2 -188.99 0.5635
AYt-2 -0.06287 0.4433
AP mt-2 206.82 1.001
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